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NOTE
SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW REFORM IN COLORADO-AN
ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 1042
INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1975, with the signing into law of House Bill No.
1042,' Colorado joined the vanguard of a nationwide movement
toward reform of laws regulating unlawful sexual behavior.2 This
reform movement has been directed primarily toward achieving
two results: The elimination of distinctions in terminology based
on gender in order to deal with both heterosexual and homosexual
assaults in accordance with the level of violence involved;3 and
the protection of the victims of such assaults from undue
harassment and humiliation in order to encourage reporting of
sexual assaults and to facilitate the prosecution and conviction
of sexual offenders.4
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-401 to -410 (Supp. 1975), amending COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-3-401 to -412 (1973). The law will be referred to herein as H.B. 1042, and the
various sections of the statute will be referred to in the text by section number, e.g.,
section 407(2), and cited in the footnotes as follows: C.R.S. § 407(2). H.B. 1042 is re-
printed in full in the Appendix to this note.
I See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 782(a), 1103(2)(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 261-264.1, 1127(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.011-.05 (West
Supp. 1975-76); IOWA CODE § 782.4 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520 to .520-1
(Supp. 1975).
1 A Michigan article noted the purposes of that state's new law, MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 750.520 to .520-1 (Supp. 1975):
The new law acknowledges that criminal sexual conduct is generally a pre-
meditated crime of violence rather than a crime provoked by the victim's
behavior ...
It should also be noted that the new law can be described as "sex-
neutral"-extending protection to men as well as to women.
Legislative Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217,
220 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Michigan's Sexual Assault Law].
I Michigan's Sexual Assault Law 236. H.B. 1042 was drafted primarily by Richard
Wood of the Denver District Attorney's office and Representative Ted Bendelow of the
Colorado House of Representatives. Mr. Wood states the following purposes for the
changes in the law: To erect barriers for the defense in order to make the crime easier to
prosecute; to simplify the prior law; and to eliminate offensive terminology. Interview with
Richard Wood, Deputy District Attorney, in Denver, June 27, 1975. Denver District
Attorney Dale Tooley expects the new law to produce more "just results," if not more
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The states which have already enacted reformed sexual as-
sault statutes have attempted to achieve the desired results in
varying ways.5 By far the most significant and potentially
troublesome step' taken by the legislatures which have enacted
reformed sexual assault laws has been the limitation which they
have placed on cross-examination of the victim concerning his or
her7 prior or subsequent sexual conduct. This limitation has been
imposed with varying degrees of severity by the legislatures which
have adopted it.'
This note analyzes in depth the Colorado legislature's re-
sponse to the demand for reform of sexual assault laws. It begins
with an examination of the Act's changes in terminology and
convictions, by encouraging the reporting of sexual assaults. Telephone interview with
Dale Tooley, Denver District Attorney, in Denver, July 30, 1975. According to Rep. Bende-
low, "Violence is the whole premise of the bill, not sex." Telephone interview with Ted
Bendelow, Colorado legislator, in Denver, Dec. 16, 1975.
'-One initial step toward reform taken by many states has been elimination of the
requirement of corroboration of the victim's testimony. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
794.022(1) (West Supp. 1975-76); IOWA CODE § 782.4 (1975), repealing IOWA CODE § 782.4
(1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520h (Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975] Minn. Sess.
Laws 1088. Delaware, which has not substantially reformed its sexual assault laws, has
eliminated the corroboration requirement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772 (Supp. 1974),
repealing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772(c) (1974). For a general discussion of the
corroboration requirement, see Note, Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not
Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972).
However, in spite of recent reform of statutes concerning sexual assaults, New York
continues to require corroboration of the victim's testimony in certain types of cases. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 1975). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972). Colorado
has not required corroboration in sexual assault cases. See La Blanc v. Patterson, 294 F.
Supp. 607 (D. Colo. 1968); Amis v. People, 83 Colo. 400, 265 P. 909 (1928); Dickens v.
People, 60 Colo. 141, 152 P. 909 (1915).
Many states have also eliminated the requirement that the victim resist to the ut-
most. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975]
Minn. Sess. Laws 1088. The elimination of the resistance requirement is reflected statuto-
rily through the adoption by many states of provisions such as sections 402(1)(b) and (c)
of the new Colorado law, in which threats of force are given the same weight as actual
use of force in determining whether a crime has been committed. The resistance require-
ment is analyzed and criticized in Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation,
18 STAN. L. REV. 680 (1966).
See text accompanying notes 49-175 infra.
The author has chosen to use the pronoun "her" throughout the remainder of this
note when referring to a sexual assault victim, based on the empirical fact that the
majority of sexual assault cases involve a female victim.
See C.R.S. § 407. See also the laws of Michigan, California, and Iowa cited in note
3 supra.
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reclassification of offenses to determine whether the legislature
has achieved a coherent, rational result from a criminal law
standpoint. Next, the note considers constitutional issues raised
by H.B. 1042, focusing on two questions. The first, in the area of
separation of powers, is whether the legislature may have ex-
ceeded its constitutional authority in enacting the evidentiary
procedures of the new law. The second, in the area of sixth
amendment rights, is whether the legislature's evidentiary re-
strictions and procedures may impermissibly interfere with an
accused sex offender's right to confront the witnesses against him.
Furthermore, this note suggests throughout that the response of
the Colorado legislature, and that of other state legislatures
which have enacted similar laws, may be delusive in its proposed
solution to the problems inherent in the prosecution of sexual
assaults.
I. TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES
H.B. 1042 repeals and reenacts part 4, article 3, title 18 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1973. The title of part 4 remains the
same-Unlawful Sexual Behavior-but the new terminology
emerges immediately thereafter in the definition section.' Gender
distinctions have been replaced by the use of the terms "actor"' 10
and "victim."" This permits the consolidation of offenses for-
merly known as "rape' '1 2 and "deviate sexual intercourse by
force""3 into one category, "sexual assault," which is then gradu-
ated in relation to the amount or type of force or violence em-
ployed.
Outstanding in the new terminology is the distinction drawn
between sexual penetration 4 and sexual intrusion. 5 When H.B.
1042 was originally introduced, sexual intrusion was included
within the definition of sexual penetration." The house of repre-
I C.R.S. § 401.
" C.R.S. § 401(1).
C.R.S. § 401(7).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401 (1973).
13 Id. § 18-3-403.
" C.R.S. § 401(6).
*s C.R.S. § 401(5).
" The submitted bill contained the following sections:




sentatives committee on the judiciary, however, apparently de-
termined that sexual intrusion should be segregated and treated
differently, and so amended the definition to read as it now does.1
7
The effect of this determination will be discussed in relation to
the classification of offenses."
The definition of the term "sexual contact"'9 is changed from
prior law to include the intentional touching of the actor's inti-
mate parts by the victim, and, also, to add the qualification that
the contact must be reasonably construed "as being for the pur-
poses of sexual arousal, gratification, -or abuse."' This qualifica-
tion is also a part of the definition of sexual intrusion, discussed
above. It would appear that in both definitions this qualification
is excess verbiage, when considered in light of part 4's built-in
medical exception" together with the "intentional" mens rea re-
quirement for sexual contact."
The new crime of sexual assault is classified into three de-
grees. Sexual assault in the first degree" includes the former
crimes of rape '5 and deviate sexual intercourse by force," with the
notable exception of "statutory rape," which, reflecting the mod-
em trend of classifying offenses in accordance with the level of
force or violence involved,2 is now classified as sexual assault in
(5)(a) "Sexual penetration" means:
(I) Sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse; or
(II) Any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body, or of any
object, into the genital or anal openings of another person's body.
(b) Emission need not be proved as an element of any sexual offense.
The submitted bill is on file at the Colorado Supreme Court library.
" HousE JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 1975, at 748-55. This amendment also added the act of
"analingus" to the definition of sexual penetration.
" Text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
1" C.R.S. § 401(4).
2" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (1973).
2 C.R.S. § 401(4).
" C.R.S. § 410.
23 Other than where the sexual contact is not inadvertent and where the sexual intru-
sion is not performed for bona fide medical purposes, it is difficult to conceive of a
situation in which the contact or intrusion could not reasonably be construed as being for
the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
2 C.R.S. § 402.
25 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401(1) (1973).
26 Id. § 18-3-403(1).
" Telephone interview with Ted Bendelow, supra note 4. See also note 3 supra.
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the second degree.2" A new section has been added to include,
as first degree sexual assault, instances where submission of the
victim is caused by the actor's "threatening to retaliate in the
future," provided that the victim reasonably believes that the
threat will be executed .2 Similar language has been added to the
section on submission of the victim caused by present threat-the
victim must believe that the actor has present ability to execute
the threat.3" One can only speculate as to the problems of proof
that the use of this type of language in a criminal statute may
create.'
Sexual assault in the first degree is a class 3 felony,32 as were
rape33 and deviate sexual intercourse by force. 34 However, a rape
conviction can no longer be reduced to a class 4 felony if the
victim "was a voluntary social companion of the offender upon
the occasion of the crime and had previously voluntarily engaged
in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with him. ' 3 In
fact, the new law has included aggravating factors which can raise
the offense to a class 2 felony. This reclassification comports well
with the legislative purpose to punish an offender in accordance
with the amount of force or violence involved and to eliminate
irrational reliance on the victim's prior conduct.
" C.R.S. § 403(e). It should be mentioned here that the new law narrows the marital
exception to sex crimes. Under prior law, the exception was inoperative as to conduct
between "spouses living apart under a decree of judicial separation." COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-3-411(2) (1973). The new law provides that the exception does not apply to
"spouses living apart, with the intent to live apart, whether or not under a decree of
judicial separation." C.R.S. § 409(2). It has been suggested by one author that a similar
differentiation in Michigan's new law between married couples living apart and those
living together may constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws. That author
commented on the law's failure to protect married persons from sexual assault by a
spouse: "[Tihe legislature decided to avoid bringing this difficult evidentiary and social
problem within the scope of the Act." Michigan's Sexual Assault Law 233.
' C.R.S. § 402(1)(c).
C.R.S. § 402(1)(b). Note that the word "reasonably" is not used in this section.
It was apparently the intent of the legislature in using this particular language to
control situations where the victim might be of superior strength. Telephone interview
with Ted Bendelow, supra note 4.
2 C.R.S. § 402(2).
a COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401(2) (1973).
3' Id. § 18-3-403(2).
3 Id. § 18-3-401(2).
' C.R.S. §§ 402(2)(a)-(c). This provision was added to the submitted bill by the
house of representatives committee on the judiciary. HousE JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 1975, at
749-50.
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Sexual assault in the second degree" includes the former
crimes of gross sexual imposition,"8 deviate sexual intercourse by
imposition, 9 corruption of minors and seduction, 0 and statutory
rape." Also included in second degree sexual assault is sexual
intrusion, discussed previously. It should be noted that prior Col-
orado criminal law did not deal with the behavior now defined as
sexual intrusion. The distinction drawn between sexual penetra-
tion and sexual intrusion is that the former refers to the actor's
use of the penis, mouth, or tongue to perform a sexual act,
whereas the latter refers to the use of some other part of the body
or an object to perform the sexual act. It is when this distinction
is considered that the differing treatment given the two categories
begins to appear irrational.
The legislature has made sexual intrusion a second degree
offense,4" and thus a class.4 felony, unless extreme force or threat
is used, in which case sexual intrusion becomes a class 3 felony.
43
At first glance, this provision appears to make it possible to pun-
ish an offender who has violently committed sexual intrusion as
severely as one who has violently committed sexual penetration.
But further inquiry reveals the fact that first degree sexual pene-
tration can be elevated to a class 2 felony when certain additional
aggravating factors are present;" sexual intrusion cannot. This
- C.R.S. § 403.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (1973).
g Id. § 18-3-404.
Jo Id. § 18-3-410. Corruption of minors and seduction was formerly a class 5 felony;
the new law raises the offense to a class 4 felony.
" The sections of H.B. 1042 dealing with statutory rape and sexual assault on a child
went through several changes in committee before attaining their final form. See House
JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 1975, at 749-50; id., Mar. 27, 1975, at 824. Apparently, a prosecutor
now has the option in a case where, for example, a 19-year-old actor causes a 14-year-old
victim to submit to sexual penetration by means of extreme force or threat, to proceed
under sections 402(1)(a), (b), or (c), or under section 403(1)(e), or under section 405.
Presumably, where extreme force or threat is present, the offender will be charged with
first degree sexual assault if there has been sexual penetration, but with sexual assault
on a child if there has been only sexual contact or sexual intrusion. See text accompany-
ing notes 41-47 infra. Where the activity is consensual, the offender can be charged under
either section 403(1)(e) or section 405, which are both class 4 felonies. This reflects the
legislature's effort to reduce the criminal sanctions imposed on consensual activity. Tele-
phone interview with Ted Bendelow, supra note 4.
4 C.R.S. § 403(1)(b).
C.R.S. § 403(2). This provision was added to the submitted bill by the house of
representatives committee on the judiciary. House JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 1975, at 750.
" See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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distinction is without rational basis if the purpose of the reclassi-
fication of the offenses is to punish offenders in accordance with
the level of force or violence involved. Surely an offender who
causes the victim to submit to a sexual act accomplished by use
of an object (sexual intrusion) and who causes this submission by
use of a deadly weapon" has committed as violent and reprehen-
sible a crime as the offender who causes the victim to submit to
a sexual act accomplished by use of the offender's mouth or penis
(sexual penetration). And yet, the first offender, under the new
law, cannot be punished as severely. Apparently, the legislators
were unable to rid themselves completely of the historical tend-
ency to view sexual assaults as crimes of passion or lust, rather
than as crimes of violence; reflecting this tendency, the Colorado
legislature determined to punish a sexual assault accomplished
by sexual means more severely than a sexual assault accom-
plished by use of an object or a part of the body not commonly
associated with sexual acts.46
Sexual assault in the third degree47 is quite similar to the
offense referred to under prior law as sexual assault.48 However,
one significant change is that, under the new law, third degree
sexual assault can be elevated from a class 1 misdemeanor to a
class 4 felony49 if extreme force or threat is used to cause submis-
sion to the sexual contact.50 Under prior law there was no elevat-
ing factor.' Sexual assault in the third degree can be read to
11 Use of a deadly weapon is one of the aggravating factors which can raise sexual
penetration to a class 2 felony. C.R.S. § 402(2)(c).
" See Michigan's Sexual Assault Law 223-24. The note discusses the "mythology of
rape" which has affected sex crimes legislation over the years, including society's tendency
to view rape as a crime of passion. See also Smith, History of Rape and Rape Laws, 60
WOMEN LAW. J. 188 (1974).
, C.R.S. § 404.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (1973).
" A possible explanation for the fact that the class 5 felony was skipped over in
providing for elevation is that there is little difference in sentencing between a class 5
felony and a class 4 felony. A class 4 felony is punishable by imprisonment from 1 day to
10 years and/or a fine of $2,000 to $30,000, and a class 5 felony is punishable by imprison-
ment from 1 day to 5 years and/or a fine of $1,000 to $15,000. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-
1-105 (Supp. 1975). With this type of "indeterminate" sentencing, any given offender will
probably serve the same number of years whether sentenced for a class 4 or a class 5 felony,
since his release date will depend primarily on individualized factors.
C.R.S. § 404(2).
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407(2) (1973).
1976
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include almost totally innocuous behavior; apparently, the legis-
lators were confident that police and prosecutorial discretion will
be exercised reasonably when bringing charges under this section.
II. EVIDENTIARY PROCEDURES AND JURY INSTRUCTION
The most outstanding feature of H.B. 1042, and of similar
laws being enacted in many states,"2 is the attempted exclusion
from trial of evidence of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual
conduct. Colorado's new law creates a presumption that opinion
evidence, reputation evidence, or evidence of specific instances of
the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct is irrelevant and,
therefore, inadmissible at trial. 3 There are two types of such
evidence which are excepted from this presumption: (1) Evidence
of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the defen-
dant; and (2) evidence of specific instances of sexual activity
showing the source of any semen, pregnancy, or disease, or any
similar evidence of sexual intercourse offered for the purpose of
showing that the act charged was or was not committed by the
defendant. 4 In short, the latter two types of evidence will be
freely admitted at trial, but any other evidence of the victim's
prior or subsequent sexual conduct will be inadmissible, unless
the statutory presumption of irrelevance can be overcome."
To rebut this presumption, the defendant must follow a spe-
cial procedure created by the legislature. 51 First, the defendant
must file a written motion, accompanied by an affidavit, 5 stating
that he has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct or of evidence of the victim's history of
false reporting of sexual assaults.58 If the court finds the offer of
proof sufficient, it must set an evidentiary hearing to be held in
52 See note 2 supra.
53 C.R.S. § 407(1).
54 C.R.S. §§ 407(1)(a), (b).
11 See C.R.S. § 407.
11 C.R.S. § 407(2).
1, C.R.S. § 407(2)(b).
11 C.R.S. § 407(2)(a). A problematical situation is created by the fact that section
407(2) describes the procedure to be followed if the defendant seeks to introduce evidence
of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct or of the victim's "history of false
reporting of sexual assaults," yet section 407(1) does not extend the presumption of irrele-
vancy to any matters other than the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct. There
is, thus, some confusion as to whether a victim's history of false reporting is presumed
irrelevant or not.
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camera prior to trial."9 At the conclusion of this hearing, if the
court finds that the evidence proposed to be offered is "relevant
to a material issue to the case," the court must order that such
evidence may be introduced at trial.6 0
A concomitant provision of the new law prohibits the jury
instruction known as the "Lord Hale" instruction."' The judge in
a sexual assault trial is now statutorily prohibited from instruct-
ing the jury "to examine with caution the testimony of the victim
solely because of the nature of the charge," or that "such a charge
is easy to make but difficult to defend against"; nor may the
judge give "any similar instruction." 2
The purpose of these statutory restrictions on evidence and
jury instructions is clear. The primary purpose is to diminish
personal harassment of the victim by controlling the introduc-
tion of evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior." Further
desired results are the encouragement of reporting of sexual as-
saults and the facilitation of conviction of offenders.
64
However, it should be noted that all of the evidentiary re-
strictions and procedures which have been enacted in the name
of equal rights for women and reform of antiquated and offensive
methods of prosecuting sexual assaults may fail to accomplish the
lofty goals set for them. A recent, exhaustive study of rape victims
indicates that the prospect of being cross-examined by a defense
attorney concerning their prior sexual conduct is not a highly
significant factor influencing sexual assault victims to refrain
from reporting or prosecuting the incident. 5 Much more influen-
C.R.S. § 407(2)(c).
C.R.S. § 407(2)(e).
, The Lord Hale instruction derives from a statement made by Sir Matthew Hale,
Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1671 to 1676, and found recorded at 1 M.
HALE. THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (S. Emlyn ed., published in this
country by R. Small 1847):
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely
and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered, that
it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to
be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.
62 C.R.S. § 408.
13 Telephone interview with Ted Bendelow, supra note 4. Mr. Bendelow noted that
the intent is also to ensure that each case is decided only on the merits of that charge
and to prevent other irrelevant instances from affecting the outcome.
1, Telephone interview with Dale Tooley, supra note 4.
11 A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: VICTIMS OF CRISIS (1974).
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tial in such a decision are victims' fears concerning: Repeating
the details of the assault to police officers, prosecuting attorneys,
and all those who will be present in the courtroom; submitting
to physical and psychological examinations; facing and living
with the unknown reactions of family and friends or the possibil-
ity of reprisals by the accused; and surviving cross-examination
by the defense attorney (which can be a devastating experience
whether or not inquiry into prior sexual conduct is permitted)."
Any attempted solution to the complex social problems in-
herent in the prosecution of sexual crimes which relies on statu-
tory evidentiary restrictions may prove to be illusory at best, and,
at worst, an unconstitutional infringement on the rights of a crim-
inal defendant. The Colorado Supreme Court will not concern
itself with the "wisdom" of such legislation,67 but will undoubt-
edly be called upon to examine the constitutionality of the legis-
lature's enactments. The following sections deal with the consti-
tutional issues which will undoubtedly arise.
A. Constitutionality-Separation of Powers-Did the Colorado
Legislature Exceed its Constitutional Power in Enacting These
Provisions?
There are two aspects of H.B. 1042 which create concern in
relation to the separation of governmental powers. The first to be
resolved is whether the legislature may enact a procedural provi-
sion such as that embodied in section 407(2) without encroaching
on the Colorado Supreme Court's rulemaking power. It will be
argued herein that the Colorado constitution vests the rulemak-
ing power in the supreme court, thereby removing this power from
the legislative sphere. If the section in question may be consid-
ered procedural, it may also be unconstitutional and void because
enacted without authority by the legislature. But an inquiry into
11 See generally id. But see contra, J. Bellacose, Practice Commentary, 11A N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76):
This is not merely a bow to women's rights objectives, but a salutary protec-
tion of the rights of victims of crime. It further serves the public interest
because it should eliminate one of the psychological deterrents . . . which
caused victims of sex offenses not to report them. These changes should now
encourage such victims to do so and to see the prosecutions through to a just
conclusion.
Id. at 76-77.
11 See 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 154 (1956) and cases cited therein.
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the Colorado Supreme Court's historical reaction to legislative
encroachment on the rulemaking power of the judiciary reveals
that the court has long permitted such encroachment and ac-
quiesced in the legislature's actions. The conclusion to be drawn
is that, although the legislature may have exceeded its authority
in creating procedural rules, the Colorado Supreme Court will not
strike down this legislation on that ground, primarily because the
court itself has not yet exercised its rulemaking power in this
particular area.
A second point which raises separation of powers questions
is the more general problem of legislative invasion of territory
which is inherently judicial. It will be argued herein that the
legislature in sections 407(1) and 408 has done more than create
an evidentiary presumption (in itself an act within the legisla-
ture's power), but instead has attempted to legislate the
relevancy of certain evidence in a criminal trial. Also, in prohibit-
ing certain jury instructions, the legislature has attempted to
limit statutorily the power of a judge to instruct a jury. It will be
suggested, however, that since the presumption of relevancy is
rebuttable, and the limitation on jury instructions is not total,
the provisions will be construed by the court to allow the judiciary
to exercise its constitutional powers, and will not be stricken as
an unconstitutional encroachment on the judiciary.
1. The Rulemaking Power
a. Development of the rulemaking power in Colorado
The Colorado constitution embraces the concept of separa-
tion of governmental powers. 8 In 1965 the constitution was
amended to vest judicial rulemaking power in the supreme
court. 9 The effect of this amendment was analyzed in depth in a
"s COLO. CONST. art. III. The clause not only separates governmental powers into three
departments, but also forbids the exercise of powers of one department by any person
charged with exercising powers of another department, except as expressly permitted in
the constitution.
4 The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the ad-
ministration of all courts and shall make and promulgate rules governing
practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases, except that the general
assembly shall have the power to provide simplified procedures in county
courts for claims not exceeding five hundred dollars and for the trial of
misdemeanors.
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
1976
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1966 article by Professor Courtland H. Peterson,7" in which he
traced the convoluted history of the rulemaking power in Colo-
rado.7'
The Colorado Supreme Court apparently made no effort at
rulemaking until the legislature passed the Enabling Act of 1913,
which mandated that the supreme court would create rules of
practice and procedure for all courts of record, which rules would
then "supersede any statute in conflict therewith." 2 The court
then adopted such rules, "supplementary to the existing Code of
Civil Procedure,""3 which had been created legislatively. In cases
concerning the rulemaking power which emerged during the sub-
sequent period, the supreme court took a strong position overall
in protection of its rulemaking function."
The clearest picture of the court's position on rulemaking
emerged through the events surrounding the 1931 case of
Kolkman v. People.75 The supreme court had adopted a rule per-
mitting trial judges to comment on the evidence in jury trials,
patterned after the federal rule. The rule was challenged in
Kolkman and the court, in upholding the rule, stated:
The judicial power of the state is vested in the courts; the legislative
and executive departments are expressly forbidden the right to exer-
Peterson, Rule Making in Colorado: An Unheralded Crisis in Procedural Reform,
38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 137 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rule Making in Coloradol.
11 According to Peterson, Colorado became a territory during a time "when legislative
dominance in the field [of rulemaking] was taken for granted." Id. at 140. Prior to this
time, during the eighteenth century and earlier, rulemaking was presumed to be an inher-
ently judicial function. But legislatures had intervened in this area in order to reform a
system of elaborate and rigid pleadings which had reached "a point where formalism
seemed as often to impede the administration of justice as to expedite it." Id. at 138.
Shortly after Colorado attained statehood, the legislature enacted a Code of Civil Proce-
dure, which was in effect until the enactment of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in
1941.
" Id. at 141-42 & nn.30-31. Prior to the 1913 Enabling Act, conflicts between statutes
and rules of inferior courts were invariably resolved in favor of the legislature. Id. at 142.
73 Id.
See, e.g., Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929), wherein the court said:
We seriously question the power of the Legislature to make any rules or to
enact any laws relative to procedure in courts. It is doubtful if the Legislature
in Colorado could have enacted any law with reference to procedure in courts
of record unless that power had been expressly or tacitly surrendered to it
by the judiciary.
Id. at 21, 278 P. at 786-87.
" 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931).
VOL. 53
SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW REFORM
cise it, and the courts, charged with the duty of exercising the judi-
cal power, must necessarily possess the means with which to effec-
tually and expeditiously discharge that duty; this duty can be per-
formed and discharged in no other manner than through rules of
procedure, and consequently this court is charged with the power
and duty of formulating, promulgating, and enforcing such rules of
procedure for the trial actions as it deems necessary and proper for
performing its constitutional functions."6
Before the Kolkman opinion was released, the Colorado legis-
lature amended the Enabling Act of 1913 by adding the provision
that the supreme court shall not make any rule permitting trial
judges to comment on the evidence in a trial." As Peterson noted,
this amendment "was a direct assault on the Court's assertion of
inherent or constitutional powers . . . ."I' The legislature reiter-
ated this prohibition in the Enabling Act of 1939.11 When the
supreme court issued the current Colorado Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure pursuant to that
Act, it retreated from its hard-line language in the Walton and
Kolkman opinions and included prohibitions against trial judges'
commenting on the evidence. 0 The schizophrenia exhibited by
the court in relation to the Kolkman case has not been resolved
in the intervening years."'
The passage of the 1965 constitutional amendment, vesting
the rulemaking power in the supreme court, at least altered the
method of approaching the problem. Peterson noted: "No longer
can the problem be approached as one of statutory construction,
or through speculation about the historically inherent powers of
courts; it has instead become a question of basic constitutional
law."82 He felt that this constitutional provision resolved the
71 Id. at 33-34, 300 P. at 584-85.
1 Ch. 132, § 1, [19311 Colo. Sess. Laws 680.
7 Rule Making in Colorado at 146.
76 Ch. 80, § 1, [1939] Colo. Sess. Laws 264.
" Rule Making in Colorado 147 & n.50.
" In 1966 Professor Peterson drew four significant conclusions concerning the devel-
opment of the rulemaking dilemma: (1) There had been no case involving a true conflict
between a statute and a court rule in which the court rule was held to override the statute;
(2) the legislature had continuously and confidently passed statutes of procedural content;
(3) the court had consistently enforced such procedural statutes without objection and,
thus, conceded to the legislature at least a concurrent power to regulate procedure; and
(4) the court had, as in the Kolkman situation, acquiesced in the legislature's overriding
rulemaking power. Id. at 148-49.
" Id. at 149.
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problem of supremacy between court rule and statute in favor
of the court, and concluded that the constitutional provision
gave exclusive rulemaking power to the supreme court by con-
struing article III and article VI, section 21 of the Colorado
constitution.1
3
Peterson noted that a strict interpretation of the amendment
would require invalidating the innumerable statutory procedural
rules on the books-"an absurd and unjust result."" His sugges-
tion was that the supreme court "issue a general rule immedi-
ately, adopting the existing statutory rules in their entirety" ' s as
a stopgap measure until such rules could be revised and reissued
by the supreme court.
The court has not acted on Peterson's suggestion. The Colo-
rado legislature has continued, since the constitutional amend-
ment of 1965, to enact statutes of procedural content, and the
supreme court, on the infrequent occasions when it has been
squarely confronted with the issue, has not chosen to enforce
strictly its exclusive rulemaking power." The "crisis" heralded by
" By applying the expressio unius, exclusio alterius maxim, Peterson concluded that
the last phrase of article VI, section 21, excepting from the court's rulemaking power the
promulgation of simplified procedures for county courts, indicated that all other rulemak-
ing power was thereby vested in the supreme court. He supported his conclusion by
reference to the last phrase of article III of the Colorado constitution, which prohibits
anyone charged with exercising powers belonging to any one of the three branches of
government from exercising any powers belonging to either of the other branches of gov-
ernment "except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." This phrase
requires that the expressio unius, exclusio alterius maxim be applied in interpreting and
construing other sections of the constitution. On the basis of this analysis, Peterson stated:
"Except with respect to simplified procedures for county courts .. general rule-making
power for the courts must . . . be taken to be excluded from legislative competence." Id.
at 151-52 & n.59.
' Rule Making in Colorado 154-55. He stated:
In view of the fact that there are literally hundreds of statutes still on the
books in Colorado, dealing with details of practice and procedure and not in
any way duplicated by existing rules of court, the withdrawal of legislative
power in this area presents a potential crisis of major proportions.
Id. at 154.
0 Id. at 155.
Re We find no specific constitutional limitation that bears upon the ques-
tion of the form or type of procedure which must be employed to challenge
an annexation, and this court has not yet exercised its rulemaking power
under Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21. . . . [The court cites Rule Making in
Colorado.]
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Professor Peterson has been ignored so effectively that, in at least
one instance, court rule and statute now coexist contentedly in
spite of the fact that their provisions conflict." Title 16 of the 1973
Colorado Revised Statutes is replete with procedural provisions
created, presumably without any power or authority, by the legis-
lature.
Despite this impressive evidence that the court is uncon-
cerned about legislative encroachment into territory explicitly
ceded to the court by the constitution, it is still necessary to
consider what the court's reaction might be when it is squarely
presented with the issue in relation to H.B. 1042. How might the
court react to a challenge to the statute based on the argument
that the procedural provisions are unconstitutional and void be-
cause the legislature lacked the constitutional authority to enact
them?
The legislature rather than arrogate unto itself the right to establish a
review procedure has adopted a specific procedure from the rules promul-
gated by this Court. . . . The statute, although providing for procedure,
created a right which is substantive in nature . . . . The matter of who may
challenge the validity of an annexation involves a substantive right. Conse-
quently, it is a proper matter for legislative action.
Fort Collins-Loveland Water Dist. v. City of Fort Collins, 174 Colo. 79, 83, 482 P.2d 986,
988 (1971).
See also Smith v. Johns, 532 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1975), in which the court held that rule
35(a) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing the court to correct an illegal
sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, and COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-
303 (1973), providing that an improper sentence to the Colorado State Reformatory will
be automatically corrected, do not conflict irreconcilably. The trial judge had corrected
the improper sentence pursuant to rule 35(a), and the defendant sought a writ of prohibi-
tion to prevent the judge from resentencing him to the state penitentiary. The supreme
court found that the trial judge acted without jurisdiction in altering the original sentence
on the theory that, since the statute corrects the improper sentence automatically, it
removes jurisdiction to change the sentence from the trial court. The court cited The
Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam:
"The [legislative] Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it."
532 P.2d at 51. The Colorado Supreme Court apparently feels helpless in the face of the
legislature's indelible power.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-6-103 (1973), as enacted by the legislature, allows
change of venue in a criminal case to another county within the same judicial district if
it is shown that the offense was committed in more than one county within the same
judicial district. On the other hand, rule 18(b)(1) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal
Procedure allows such a change of venue if the offense was also committed or an act in
furtherance of the offense occurred in the county where the case is to be transferred.
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b. H.B. 1042's evidentiary procedures and the rulemak-
ing power
The threshold question is whether section 407(2) embodies
principles of substantive or of procedural law. It has been held in
cases of this type that any legislative attempt to create rules of
procedure constitutes an intrusion on the power of the supreme
court and, thus, would be in violation of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, unless the enactment were substantive in nature.m
The distinction between substantive and procedural matters has
been drawn fairly clearly: Substantive law creates and regulates
rights, whereas procedural law prescribes the method of enforcing
and implementing those rights and regulates the steps by which
one who has violated the rights of others may be punished. 9 Nev-
ertheless, in many instances it can be extremely difficult to define
a given provision as substantive or as procedural;' some statutes,
such as H.B. 1042, are of mixed substantive and procedural con-
tent.
It appears evident on the face of section 407(2) that it is
procedural in nature.9' Thus the basis exists for a legal challenge
on the ground that the legislature exceeded its authority in enact-
ing it. However, one significant factor militates against the su-
preme court's striking down section 407(2), the fact that there is
currently no court rule in effect which would control the matters
encompassed in that section.2 The statute thus creates no actual
' Johnson v. State, 308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
,9 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, modified, 312 U.S. 655 (1940); Hardamon
v. Municipal Ct., 178 Colo. 271, 497 P.2d 1000 (1972); State v. Elmore, 179 La. 1057, 155
So. 896 (1934); State v. Rodosta, 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931); Barker v. St. Louis
County, 340 Mo. 986,104 S.W.2d 371 (1937); In re McCombs' Estate, 80 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio
P. Ct. 1948).
O Rule Making in Colorado 163-64.
" Section 407 reads in pertinent part:
(2) In any criminal prosecution under sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405 ... if
evidence [of the victim's prior sexual conduct] . . . is to be offered at trial,
the following procedure shall be followed ....
(Emphasis added.) At this writing, at least one Colorado district court has held section
407 to be procedural. Brief for Defendant in support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, People v.
Madrigal. Crim. No. 3965 (Denver Dist. Ct., filed July 8, 1975).
,2 The closest parallel which can be drawn between currently used procedure and the
newly created evidentiary hearing procedure is the motion in limine (literally, "motion
at the outset"). This motion is frequently utilized prior to trial or during trial when a party
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conflict with an extant rule of court. A study of decisional law in
various states whose constitutions vest the rulemaking power in
their supreme courts indicates clearly that, in those cases in
which a procedural statute has been successfully attacked on
grounds of legislative encroachment on the power of the judiciary,
the statute in question has been in conflict with an existing court
rule on the same subject. 3 A Colorado case dealing with similar
issues was Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities
Commission.94 In that case the court was called upon to consider
the validity of a legislative directive to the public utilities com-
mission to adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of commis-
sion hearings. The separation of powers issue involved in the case
related to the supreme court's exclusive power to regulate the
practice of law and the possibility that the legislative directive
constituted an infringement of the judicial prerogative. The
court, by "presuming that the Legislature had no intention of
infringing upon the court's authority," managed to construe the
directive in such a way as to preclude any interference with the
power to regulate the practice of law. In doing so, the court said:
In the determination of the qualifications for admission of persons
to practice law, and in the regulation and discipline of those licensed
to practice law, this Court is vested by the people through the Con-
stitution with the sole power to act. Legislation in any of these areas
does not add to or detract from the exclusive authority of this Court.
Wherever legislation conforms to our authority, it is gratuitous. Leg-
islation tending to limit the scope of that which constitutes the
practice of law would be abortive."
wants to limit or prevent the introduction of evidence on a certain point (for example,
cross-examination of a criminal defendant concerning prior felony convictions which de-
fense counsel contends are too remote in time to be admissible). The motion in limine is
a creation of the common law; there is no court rule (or statute) in Colorado providing for
the procedure.
g3 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (supreme court
rule concerning presentence reports indicates that the matter is within the court's power
and any legislative enactment on the subject violates the separation of powers; a rule of
procedure promulgated and adopted by the supreme court cannot be amended or su-
perceded by an act of the legislature); Lawrence R. McCoy Co. v. S.S. Theomitor III, 133
N.J. Super. 308, 336 A.2d 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. L. Div. 1975) (court rules extending to
matters of practice, procedure, and administration are not subject to overriding legisla-
tion).
154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467 (1964).
Id. at 277, 391 P.2d at 470.
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It is possible to analogize between the supreme court's exclu-
sive power to regulate the practice of law and its exclusive power
to promulgate rules of court procedure. The last two sentences of
the above quotation are indicative of the court's probable reac-
tion to a constitutional challenge to section 407(2). There being
no preexisting rule of court on the procedure to be followed in a
motion to admit evidence presumed inadmissible," the legisla-
tion will in all likelihood be found not "tending to limit the scope
of" the court's rulemaking power, and will not be struck down on
this ground. 7
2. Legislative Encroachment on Inherently Judicial Func-
tions
a. The evidentiary restrictions
It is a well established principle in Colorado that the power
of the state legislature is plenary and only limited by restrictions
imposed by the state constitution. In questioning the validity of
a state statute, the constitution is examined only to determine
whether its passage is prohibited therein.9 In keeping with this
principle, it has been held that the legislature acts within its
power when it enacts substantive rules of evidence'00 or when it
declares one fact to be presumptive evidence of another.'"' So at
first glance it would appear that, in creating by statute the pre-
sumption that evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct is irrel-
" See note 92 supra.
7 See 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 128 n.68.5 (Supp. 1975) and accompanying text. An-
other approach the court might take in upholding the procedural provisions is that taken
by the Maryland Supreme Court in Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335
A.2d 679 (1975). There, it was noted that "courts are under a special duty to respect the
legislative judgment where legislation is attempting to solve a serious problem in a manner
which has not had an opportunity to prove its worth." Id. at 684.
'" Colorado State Civil Serv. Emp. Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968);
Denver Milk Producers v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 116 Colo. 389, 183 P.2d 529,
appeal dismissed, 334 U.S. 809 (1947); Metzger v. People, 98 Colo. 133, 53 P.2d 1189
(1936); Colacino v. People, 80 Colo. 417, 252 P. 350 (1927); Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417,
36 P. 218 (1894); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891);
Alexander v. People ex rel. Schofield, 7 Colo. 155, 2 P. 894 (1884); People v. Wright, 6
Colo. 92 (1881); People ex rel. Tucker v. Rucker, 5 Colo. 455 (1880).
" See cases cited note 98 supra.
People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 228, 512 P.2d 269 (1973).
City & County of Denver v. Smerdal, 165 Colo. 475, 440 P.2d 158 (1968); Bishop
v. Salida Hosp. Dist., 158 Colo. 315, 406 P.2d 329 (1965); Robertson v. People, 20 Colo.
279, 38 P. 326 (1894).
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evant in a sexual assault trial, the Colorado legislature is acting
within its authority.
However, it must be noted that in H.B. 1042 the legislature
has created more than a simple evidentiary presumption; it has
attempted to legislate the relevancy of certain evidence in a crim-
inal trial. Does the fact that the key word is "relevancy" require
a finding that the legislature is encroaching on the judicial func-
tion? '°
Determination of the relevancy of evidence in a judicial pro-
ceeding is generally considered to be a judicial, rather than a
legislative, function. 0 3 It has been suggested that "a legislature
may not determine relevancy directly, but only indirectly by de-
fining the crime of rape, and the defenses applicable to it," and
that "attempts via legislative fiat to remove discretion from the
courts and to rule all such evidence [of a victim's prior sexual
conduct] irrelevant and inadmissible must fail."'0 4
In Colorado, determination of the relevancy of this type of
evidence in a sexual assault trial was formerly left entirely to the
discretion of the trial court. In Olguin v. People'015 and Struna v.
People'6 objections to such questions of the victim as, "Have you
ever had any sex experience prior to this time?" were held pro-
16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 104 (1956):
[Clonstitutional government in the United States is distinguished by the
care that has been exercised in committing the legislative, executive, and
judicial functions to separate departments, and in forbidding any encroach-
ment by one department on another in exercise of the authority so
delegated ...
[It is an established and fundamental principle of constitutional law that
one department cannot interfere with, or encroach on, either of the other
departments, in the absence of an express provision therefor, notwithstand-
ing the constitution does not expressly so require.
lOS 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 104 (1956): "Generally, investigation of the facts involved
in a controversy and the determination of their relevancy are matters for the judiciary,
and not the legislature .... "
'", Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior
Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of
Reality or Denial of Due Process? 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 418, 426 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Limitations on Evidence]. The quoted material refers to the new Michigan sexual
assault law, supra note 2, which conclusively presumes such evidence to be irrelevant
except in two limited situations.
" 115 Colo. 147, 170 P.2d 285 (1946).
" 121 Colo. 348, 215 P.2d 905 (1950).
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perly sustained because the questions were so general that any
answer would be improper and irrelevant."
7
Thus, it would appear that any exercise by the legislature of
the power to determine the relevancy of evidence would consti-
tute an encroachment on an inherently judicial function. But the
separation of powers in this area has not been strictly enforced.
While it has been said that the legislature may exercise judicial
powers which are "incident and essential to the discharge of legis-
lative functions""'" and that the legislature may determine that
certain evidence is inadmissible in certain cases,'"9 it has also
been held that the legislature cannot wipe out basic and funda-
mental rules governing the competency of evidence'I and that the
legislature may not act in such a way as to prevent the judiciary
from exercising its powers."'
Obviously, the law is not clear or precise on this point. Two
aspects of the issue are clear, however. One is that it is within the
power of the legislature to declare the public policy of the state."'
Clearly, the legislature intends to establish the policy that vic-
tims of sexual assaults should be protected from inquiry into their
past lives. But the legislature may not implement its policy in a
manner which is unconstitutional, e.g., by encroaching on the
power of the judiciary.
The other significant aspect of this issue is that the presump-
", According to Rollie Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, and Sherry Seiber,
Deputy Public Defender, in sexual assault trials prior to the passage of H.B. 1042, admissi-
bility of evidence concerning the victim's past sexual conduct was always subject to
relevancy standards. Interviews with Rollie Rogers, in Denver, Aug. 6, 1975, and with
Sherry Seiber, in Denver, June 24, 1975.
16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 108 (1956).
Id. § 128d.
W' illiams v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 Colo. 458, 319 P.2d 1078 (1958).
Dines v. Harris, 88 Colo. 22, 291 P. 1024 (1930). As early as 1890 the Colorado
Supreme Court said:
Undoubtedly, legislation may and must cover a wide range of subjects, con-
nected directly or indirectly with judicial action; but that a limit exists
somewhere to legislative power over the manner in which courts created by
the constitution shall perform judicial duties, and conduct judicial business,
will hardly be questioned.
DeVotie v. McGerr, 14 Colo. 577, 592, 23 P. 980, 985 (1890).
'" Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950); Isaak v. Perry, 118 Colo.
93, 193 P.2d 269 (1948); Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929). See also Michi-
gan's Sexual Assault Law 229.
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tion created in section 407(1) is rebuttable. Section 407(2) lays
out the procedure for rebutting the presumption of irrelevancy.
It is widely agreed that, although the legislature may create an
evidentiary presumption, it cannot create a presumption which
is conclusive." 3 The Colorado case of Garcia v. People"' held that
the power vested in the legislature to create presumptions in
criminal cases is subject to the qualification that the presumption
cannot be made a conclusive one." ' Since the presumption of
irrelevancy created by the legislature in H.B. 1042 is explicitly
made rebuttable, the bill permits the judicial branch to exercise
a modicum of discretion and, thus, may narrowly escape being an
unconstitutional encroachment by the legislature on this inher-
ently judicial function.
b. The jury instruction prohibition
A similar encroachment problem is encountered in relation
to the abolition of the Lord Hale instruction in section 408. Does
the legislature encroach on judicial territory when it determines
what instructions may or may not be given to a jury? Unfortu-
nately, the law is not clear or precise on this point either. It is
generally accepted that the determination of the jury instructions
which may or may not be proper in a given case is an inherently
judicial function."" While the legislature "may regulate the pro-
cedure of trial courts with respect to instructions to juries, it
cannot abridge the power of the judge to charge the law.""' 7
While there is apparently no precedent in Colorado for a
statutory limitation on the court's power to instruct the jury, a
study of California's new sexual assault law"' may provide some
insight into this problem. By amendment of the Penal Code, the
California legislature made significant statutory changes in the
type of instructions which may be given to the jury in sexual
16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 128d (1956).
" 121 Colo. 130, 213 P.2d 387 (1950).
Id. at 134, 213 P.2d at 389.
"' See 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 166 (1956).
17 Id. § 128g.
"I See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1127(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1975). Minnesota's new law also
abolishes a number of formerly used jury instructions, including the Lord Hale instruction
and any cautionary instruction concerning the victim's testimony. Ch. 374, § 8, [19751
Minn. Sess. Laws 1088.
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assault cases. One amendment"9 prohibits the giving of former
California Jury Instruction 10.06, which stated that the jury
could draw the inference that a woman who had previously con-
sented to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent
again. Under the new amendment to the Penal Code, a judge may
not instruct that any such inference may be drawn except where
there is evidence of prior sexual conduct with the defendant. This
amendment also forbids any instruction that prior sexual conduct
in and of itself may be considered in determining the credibility
of the witness. Another amendment'20 banned the use of the term
"unchaste character" in any jury instruction. It is interesting to
note, however, that California's Lord Hale instruction was not
eliminated or otherwise affected by the recent amendments to the
Penal Code.' 2'
As of this writing, there has been no reported challenge to the
California legislature's power to enact these amendments. In Col-
orado, the changes wrought by section 408 affect only the Lord
Hale instruction,'22 which has operated in the manner of a cau-
tionary instruction: Where the testimony of the victim was
largely uncorroborated by other evidence, trial judges often
deemed it necessary to "remind" the jury that it is easy to accuse
someone of rape, yet difficult to defend against such a charge,
and, thus, the testimony of the victim should be viewed with
caution.'13 Section 408 prohibits the giving of such an instruction
or "any similar instruction."
It is in the interpretation and construction of the word "simi-
lar" that the constitutional salvation of this section may lie. The
objections which have been voiced to this section center on the
proposition that in certain cases, admittedly a small minority, a
cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of the victim may
be appropriate. 2 ' Such instructions are frequently given where
accomplice testimony or eyewitness testimony is involved.' If
SCAL. PENAL CODE § 1127d (West Supp. 1975).
' Id. § 1127e.
121 For a thorough analysis of the evidentiary provisions of the new California law, see
Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1551 (1975) [hereinafter cited as California Rape Evidence Reform].
"2 For explanation of the Lord Hale instruction, see note 60 supra.
'11 Interview with Rollie Rogers, note 107 supra.
"I Interview with Sherry Seiber, note 107 supra.
21 Id. See also United States v. Lee, 506 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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this objection is considered valid, a court may construe the prohi-
bition against "any similar instruction" very narrowly in order to
allow an instruction that the jury should "examine with caution
the testimony of the victim," as long as the words "because of the
nature of the charge" are not used.'2 8 Thus, if the courts are still
permitted, under section 408, to give a cautionary instruction in
an "appropriate" case, the judicial function can still be per-
formed, and any legislative encroachment which has occurred
may be considered harmless.'1
B. Constitutionality-the Sixth Amendment-Do the
Evidentiary Provisions Violate a Criminal Defendant's Right to
Confront the Witnesses Against Him?
If H.B. 1042 survives the constitutional challenges based on
the separation of powers, it must face yet another challenge,
which may prove insurmountable. In the 1973 case of People v.
Smith'21 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the legislature
has the power to prescribe new rules or to change existing rules
of substantive evidence, "so long as they do not violate constitu-
tional requirements or deprive any person of constitutional
rights. '"12
The evidentiary provisions of H.B. 1042 impose limitations
on the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the victim con-
cerning her prior sexual conduct. In order to do so, the defendant
must first submit an affidavit and offer of proof as to the rele-
vancy of such evidence, and the court must find these to be "suffi-
cient" before allowing in camera cross-examination of the victim
on the issue of her prior sexual conduct 30 An inquiry into the
constitutional propriety of such a limitation must begin with a
The quoted excerpts are from C.R.S. § 408.
" At least one state supreme court has concurred in the abolition of the Lord Hale
instruction. In State v. Fedderson, 230 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1975), the court specifically
disapproved the Lord Hale instruction, saying that the jury should not be asked to apply
a stricter test of credibility to the victim of a sexual assault than to other witnesses or to
victims of other crimes. The court said: "It is a subject for jury exhortation by the de-
fendant's lawyer but not a postulate for instruction by the court." Id. at 515. The "wis-
dom" of section 408 is apparent; it is only the method of affecting the change which is
subject to constitutional attack.
12 182 Colo. 228, 512 P.2d 269 (1973).
"I Id. at 234, 512 P.2d at 272 (emphasis added).
'D C.R.S. § 407.
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close look at the nature and scope of the right to confrontation of
witnesses.
1. The Right to Confrontation -Davis v. Alaska and Bias
Evidence
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution,
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, 3' states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...
be confronted with the witnesses against him .... 31
It is established law that the object of the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment is to ensure to a criminal defendant the
right of examination and cross-examination of witnesses against
him.' 3 But how broad is the right to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses? Is it totally unbridled, or is its scope limited?
The recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Davis v.
Alaska"' sheds considerable light on the question of the scope of
the right to confrontation. The parallel between the nature and
purpose of the limitations on cross-examination involved in that
case and the nature and purpose of the limitations imposed by
section 407 is evident from the Supreme Court's opening remarks:
We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Confronta-
tion Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed
to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-
examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness'
probationary status as a juvenile delinquent when such an impeach-
ment would conflict with a State's asserted interest in preserving the
confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency."'
The juvenile witness in that case testified that he had seen
the defendant at a location near the witness' own home, where
stolen property was found. Defense counsel wanted to introduce
the witness' juvenile record and probationary status solely for the
' Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" Morse v. Wilson, 500 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1974). Wigmore has said:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent
the opportunity of cross-examination. . . which cannot be had except by the
direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.
5 J. WwIo, EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn ed. 1974).
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
' Id. at 309.
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purpose of showing the possibility of "hasty and faulty identifica-
tion of petitioner [the defendant] to shift suspicion away from
himself [the witness] . "... : The trial court refused to permit
the introduction of such evidence, thus allowing the juvenile
witness' testimony, on cross-examination, that he had never
before been interrogated by law enforcement officers, to stand
unchallenged. The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's ruling. In reversing, the Supreme Court said:
We cannot accept the Alaska Supreme Court's conclusion that
the cross-examination that was permitted defense counsel was ade-
quate to develop the issue of bias properly to the jury. While counsel
was permitted to ask Green whether he was biased, counsel was
unable to make a record from which to argue why Green might have
been biased . . . . In this setting we conclude that the right of
confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a
juvenile offender ...
The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of
a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a
constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an
adverse witness. . . .[Tihe State cannot, consistent with the right
of confrontation, require the petitioner to bear the full burden of
vindicating the State's interest in the secrecy of juvenile criminal
records. 7
In Davis the Supreme Court clearly delivered the message that
the right of a defendant to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses cannot be made to yield to a state's policy interests, at
least where a significant issue such as bias is involved. In order
to fall directly within the scope of the Davis holding, a limitation
on cross-examination must first be an expression of the public
policy of the state. Clearly, section 407 was enacted in further-
ance of the state's policy interest in protecting victims of sexual
assaults from unwarranted probing into their prior sexual activi-
ties. "' Secondly, such a limitation must operate so as to preclude
a showing of potential bias on the part of an adverse witness. It
is the Court's reliance on characterization of the evidence sought
as "bias" evidence that makes the Davis holding difficult to pin
down.
' Id. at 311.
Id. at 318-20.
'' See note 112 supra and accompanying text. See also text accompanying note 4
supra.
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If the Davis holding is to be limited to cases involving bias,
it is necessary to consider whether evidence of a victim's prior
sexual conduct can be considered to be evidence showing bias on
the part of the victim. Bias on the part of a witness has been
defined as: "A ground of impeachment; near relationship, sympa-
thy, hostility or prejudice."'' 9 It includes "[p]artiality, or any
acts, relationships or motives reasonably likely to produce it" as
well as various types of "self-interest."' 40 It is certainly conceiva-
ble that, in some sexual assault cases, evidence of the victim's
prior sexual conduct might be introduced to show bias on the part
of the victim/witness."' It follows from the holding in Davis that
if a defendant in a sexual assault trial seeks to introduce evidence
Rf the victim's prior sexual conduct in order to show the victim's
bias, then the state's policy of protecting the victim from unwar-
ranted questioning must yield.'42
2. The Right to Confrontation- Other Areas of Cross-
Examination
In many sexual assault cases bias of the victim per se may
not be the issue. Cross-examination concerning the victim's prior
sexual conduct in these cases may be for the purpose of showing
consent by the victim or to discredit her testimony on direct
examination.'4 3 The question remains whether the right to con-
" BALLANTINE's LAw DICTIONARY 133 (3d ed. 1969).
,0 D. MCCORMICK. EVIDENCE § 40 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 940-53
(Chadbourn ed. 1974).
" In order to determine whether section 407 will produce just results in all cases
arising under it, it is necessary to hypothesize a case in which the victim is fabricating
the charge and the defendant is in fact not guilty. The law must not operate in such a
way as to prevent an innocent defendant from being acquitted. If a case arises in which
the victim has a history of extramarital sexual relations unknown to her husband and the
victim charges her "discovered" partner with sexual assault in order to prevent her hus-
band from learning of her activities, introduction of evidence of her prior sexual conduct
would be authorized under Davis, in order to "make a record" from which to argue why
the victim might have been testifying from motives of self-interest.
1' More impressive considerations than a state's policy interests have been required
to yield to sixth amendment demands, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
in which executive privilege and presidential confidentiality were held to be subordinate
to a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights to confrontation of witnesses and com-
pulsory process.
"' The California law specifically prohibits the use of prior sexual conduct evidence
for the purpose of proving consent; the only potential use for such evidence in California
is for impeaching credibility. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103 (West Supp. 1975). The laws of
Florida and Minnesota specifically permit introduction of such evidence, after an eviden-
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frontation extends beyond the area of bias evidence, as enun-
ciated in Davis, to other areas of cross-examination.144
As Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Davis indicates,
the right to confrontation has never been considered to be unlim-
ited:
I would emphasize that the Court neither holds nor suggests
that the Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the
general credibility of a witness through cross-examination about his
past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions."'
However, at least one case applying Davis has extended its hold-
ing considerably. In Ohio v. Cox' the court held:
[A legislative] enactment may not impinge upon the right of a
defendant in a criminal case to present all available, relevant and
probative evidence which is pertinent to a specific and material
aspect of his defense." '7
tiary hearing, to show consent. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1975-76); ch.
374, § 8, [19751 Minn. Sess. Laws 1088. The laws of Minnesota and New York specifically
permit introduction of such evidence, after an evidentiary hearing, to rebut the direct
testimony of the prosecutrix. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CraM.
Paoc. LAW § 60.42(5) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
" Many of the cases decided subsequent to the Davis decision have limited the
holding in various ways: Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975) (refusing to admit
evidence of witness' false swearing five years earlier held harmless because too remote in
time and also because witness' testimony only corroborative); United States v. Duhart,
511 F.2d 7 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 421 U.S. 1006 (1975) (Davis distin-
guished because here witness not crucial to prosecution's case); United States v. Miranda,
510 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1975) (held right to cross-examination had been denied when court
refused to allow questioning of prosecution witness concerning other employees who had
keys to cabinet from which funds were embezzled); United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1974) (reversible error to deny cross-examination of government witness-an
informant-to show bias); Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alas.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
868 (1974) (Davis distinguished in holding not error to refuse to allow cross-examination
concerning witness' juvenile record where purpose was only to impeach general credibil-
ity); Hyman v. United States, 342 A.2d 43 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (not improper to limit
confrontation where opportunity to show bias not substantially impaired); State v. Hum-
mel, 132 N.J. Super. 412, 334 A.2d 52 (1975) (upheld trial court's refusal to permit de-
fendant to cross-examine sexual abuse victims, foster wards in defendant's home, concern-
ing prior fabrications, instances of misconduct, and disorderly behavior for purposes of
showing motive to fabricate against defendant, who enforced strict discipline; court distin-
guished Davis by finding proposed evidence would not show bias or motive to fabricate);
State v. Burr, 525 P.2d 1067 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974) (limiting Davis to bias evidence, not
evidence to show character generally).
" Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 321 (1974).




Applying this reasoning, the right to cross-examine a witness con-
cerning certain matters may depend on a judicial determination
of materiality of the evidence sought.
It has been argued that evidence of the victim's prior sexual
conduct is never material to the issues of consent or credibility.'48
Apparently, the Michigan legislature was of this opinion when it
enacted its new sexual assault statute. The evidentiary restric-
tions contained therein require the exclusion of all evidence relat-
ing to the victim's prior sexual conduct, with a possible exception
made for evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the
defendant or evidence of prior acts of intercourse to show the
source of any pregnancy, semen, or disease.'49 Even if a modicum
of materiality is granted to such evidence by proponents of laws
such as Michigan's, its probative value is said to be clearly out-
weighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury.'5 0
And, of course, the policy considerations prompting the eviden-
tiary restrictions are given great significance. It is argued that,
even though such evidence could be "logically relevant," it may
not be "legally relevant."' 5 '
"I See Limitations on Evidence, supra note 104, which takes the position that unless
it can be proved that prior sexual conduct is not material to the issue of consent, sexual
assault laws such as Michigan's (which completely bars any evidence of prior sexual
conduct with two narrow exceptions, see note 149 infra) will be found to be an unconstitu-
tional restriction of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights. The question is raised
whether a victim's prior sexual history is "probative of her propensity to consent to
intercourse." Limitations on Evidence, supra note 104, at 412. That author argues that
reputation evidence in today's society cannot be considered to be of any probative value
in this regard. Specific prior sexual acts may be a more reliable form of evidence if the
complainant's "propensity to have consensual intercourse is dependent on the quality and
quantity of her prior sexual experience," id. at 415, but he argues that today such a
conclusion cannot be drawn: "For women today, what they have done in the past has no
bearing whatsoever on their future decisions." Id. at 414. The author's conclusions are,
however, somewhat tentative; he seems to feel that there may be cases in which such
evidence might be material to the issues raised.
", MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (Supp. 1975).
See People v. Byers, 10 Cal. App. 3d 410, 88 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970). See also the
comment on Lynn v. State, 231 Ga. 559, 203 S.E.2d 221 (1974), 8 GA. L. REV. 973 (1974),
where it is pointed out that admitting evidence of prior sexual conduct may permit the
jury to accept "presumed, instead of actual, consent as a defense." Id. at 981.
See also Michigan's Sexual Assault Law: "[Situdies indicated that juries are
strongly influenced by the behavior of the victim. Despite instructions by the judge, juries
often respond as though they were applying the legal theory of assumption of risk." Id. at
225.
" Michigan's Sexual Assault Law 229. The author of the Michigan note compares
the exclusion of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct to the exclusion of evidence
VOL. 53
SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW REFORM
On the other side of the issue, it has been argued just as
fervently that evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is
always material to the issue of consent,' ' 2 or, even if the defense
is not consent, to impeach the credibility of the victim/witness.'
3
There is no clear resolution to this debate. The most reasonable
approach would appear to be the individualized approach: The
court must view each case in its own factual setting, and then
determine whether the probative value of evidence of the victim's
prior sexual conduct is of such potential magnitude that its preju-
dicial effect on the jury must be considered to be subordinate to
a defendant's right to refute the case against him.'54 This is the
of subsequent repairs in a personal injury case and finds no sixth amendment violation
in either case. The author argues that both types of evidence may be logically relevant,
but the legislature (in the case of prior sexual conduct) and the courts (in the case of
subsequent repairs) have determined that for reasons of public policy the evidence is not
legally relevant and is, therefore, inadmissible. In comparing the court-evolved rule of law
with the legislatively-enacted one, the author states: "The distinction between the two
law-making processes is probably too slight to support a finding that one is constitution-
ally valid and the other is not." Id.
The fallacy in this reasoning is that it is not the distinction between "court-evolved"
and "legislatively-enacted" which is significant in the comparison. The significant fact is
that the subsequent repairs rule operates in a civil context and the prior sexual conduct
rule operates in a criminal context. The rights of a criminal defendant are the most
zealously guarded rights in American jurisprudence; an exclusionary rule of civil law
cannot be so lightly correlated to an exclusionary rule which may operate to deprive a
criminal defendant of constitutional rights. See State v. Swenson, 62 Wash. 2d 259, 270,
382 P.2d 614, 625-26 (1963); 8 GA. L. REV. 973 (1974). Furthermore, the sixth amendment
does not even apply to civil proceedings, but only to "the accused" in a "criminal prosecu-
tion." See text accompanying note 132 supra. See also California Rape Evidence Reform
1567.
52 Clearly, evidence of a prosecutrix's past consensual sexual conduct
is illustrative of her capacity to consent and at least changes the probability,
no matter how slightly, that she might have consented on the occasion in
question.
8 GA. L. REV. 973, 979 (1974). See also People v. Sharpe, 183 Colo. 64, 514 P.2d 1138 (1973).
"I' See generally California Rape Evidence Reform. The author recognizes the opinion
that unchastity has no bearing on honesty or veracity, but points out that such evidence
may be used to prove bias, interest, or motive to fabricate, or to contradict the direct
testimony of the victim. See also Teagne v. State, 208 Ga. 459, 67 S.E.2d 467 (1951), and
Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent, and
Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309, 328 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Trial of a Rape
Case].
"I The "individualized" approach has gained more support than the two extreme
views.
The time has surely come to reject the automatic assumption that unchastity
is relevant to the issue of consent, but in the laudable effort to minimize the
trauma of trial for victims of rape, the pendulum should not swing so far as
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approach which should have been taken by trial judges under
prior Colorado law,'55 but it has been open to considerable
abuse. 151 It was to curb such abuse that H.B. 1042 was enacted.,57
If the evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is mate-
rial to an issue in the case, whether its purpose be to show bias,
to show consent on the part of the victim, to contradict the vic-
tim's testimony on direct examination, or to prove any other spe-
cific and relevant matter,' the sixth amendment clearly requires
that the defendant be permitted to bring out the evidence on
cross-examination. 59 If the value of the proposed evidence is not
known, and if the inquiry itself may be highly prejudicial if con-
ducted before the jury, it may be necessary to conduct the cross-
examination in camera to make a preliminary determination of
the relevancy of the evidence. 60 But it is clear that at least this
preliminary determination must be permitted:
Counsel often cannot know in advance what pertinent facts may be
elicited on cross-examination. For that reason it is necessarily ex-
ploratory .... It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable lati-
tude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state
to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might de-
velop. "'
The clearest expression of the scope of the right to confronta-
to shift basic due process concepts from protection of the accused to protec-
tion of the accuser.
California Rape Evidence Reform 1570. See also 8 GA. L. REV. 973 (1974); Limitations on
Evidence, supra note 104.
"I According to Rollie Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, "The new procedure
doesn't change substantially what should have been happening before." Interview with
Rollie Rogers, supra note 107.
' Id.
'7 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
. See text accompanying note 145 supra. It is apparent from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Davis that what is required is, at the least, some specific use for the evidence
sought to be introduced in order to override a state's policy interest in preventing the
introduction of the evidence.
'5' Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
" This is the approach which has been attempted in the new evidentiary procedures
enacted in many states, including Colorado.
* Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931). In Alford the Court also stated:
[N]o obligation is imposed on the court ... to protect a witness from being
discredited on cross-examination .... There is a duty to protect him from
questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely
to harass, annoy or humiliate him.
Id. at 694. See also Best v. United States, 328 A.2d 378 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
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tion as it may apply in Colorado is found in United States v.
Jorgenson, "2 a Tenth Circuit case, in which the court said:
The right to confrontation extends to areas of cross-examination. An
area which is properly subject to cross-examination cannot be de-
nied the accused. A limitation which prevents cross-examination
into an area which is properly subject to cross-examination does
constitute reversible error. The characteristic feature in this situa-
tion is the complete denial of access to an area which is properly the
subject of cross-examination; the extent of cross-examination is dis-
cretionary with the trial judge [citing cases]. This distinction has
long been recognized by this Court." 3
Assuming that there are at least some sexual assault cases
in which the "area" of the prior sexual conduct of the victim will
be material to the issues of the case, the inquiry must now be
directed toward section 407 in order to determine whether a de-
fendant's "access" to such evidence is impermissibly restricted.
3. The Right to Confrontation-The Evidentiary Restric-
tions of Section 407
Section 407(1) creates a presumption that evidence concern-
ing the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct is irrelevant
in a sexual assault trial. ' The presumption itself does not neces-
sarily interfere with the defendant's constitutional rights because
it is rebuttable.' 5 There are two types of prior sexual conduct
evidence which are excepted from the presumption and, thus,
apparently admissible at trial.' 8 Any proposed evidence of the
victim's prior sexual conduct which does not fall within these
narrow exceptions must first be filtered through the procedures
outlined in section 407(2)187 if it is to be admitted at trial.
The threshold requirement for a determination of the rele-
vancy of such evidence is the submission of a motion by the
defendant accompanied by an affidavit stating an offer of proof
that the evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct sought to
be introduced is relevant and material to the case.' 8 This means
82 451 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972).
"3 451 F.2d at 519-20. See also Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975).
"3 See Appendix.
"3 See notes 113 & 114 supra and accompanying text.
" C.R.S. § 407(1).
87 See Appendix.
"3 C.R.S. §§ 407(2)(a), (b).
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that the defendant must know specifically what that evidence is
before being given an opportunity to question the victim about
it. "I Such knowledge is often difficult, if not impossible, to gain. 7
For example, if the victim has a history of false reporting of sexual
assaults'7' and if this information is not available through local
police or court records (as in cases where no charges were filed or
if the false reporting occurred in another state), the defendant
may have no other "access" to this "area" of cross-examination
than questioning the victim directly under oath. But under sec-
tion 407(2), the defendant may not question the victim (at trial
or in camera) on this subject unless he has first submitted an offer
of proof stating the nature of the evidence of which he has no
present knowledge! The discovery burden placed on the defen-
dant may be insurmountable, and the evidence left "undiscov-
ered" may be of significant materiality.
Submission to the court of such a motion and affidavit, even
if it is possible, does not lead automatically to an in camera
confrontation with the victim. Under section 407(2)(c), the court
must find that the offer of proof is "sufficient" before setting an
in camera hearing.' There are no standards set out for a determi-
"I It is possible through a narrow reading of section 407 to interpret it as permitting
the questioning of the victim about such evidence at trial, but prohibiting the introduction
of extrinsic evidence to show prior sexual conduct. This was not the intention of the
legislature-its purpose was to prevent any inquiry concerning prior sexual conduct unless
such inquiry had first been ruled admissible by the court. Telephone interview with Ted
Bendelow, supra note 4. Furthermore, since the evidence is presumed irrelevant, it can
be expected that an objection to any line of questioning in the area of prior sexual conduct
would be sustained by the trial judge in the absence of a prior ruling of admissibility.
The new sexual assault laws of Iowa and Minnesota state that no reference may be
made to the victim's prior sexual conduct in the presence of the jury except as their
evidentiary hearing procedures permit. IowA CODE § 782.4 (1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975]
Minn. Sess. Laws 1088.
'T' Interviewing witnesses, especially the complainant, is not without
difficulties, for the prosecutor may insist that defense counsel (or his investi-
gator) identify himself and explain the purpose of the interview. Defense
attorneys complain that this introduction permits the witness the choice of
refusing to discuss the case, thus depriving them of a most critical means of
discovery.
Trial of a Rape Case 317 n.33. In practice it has been found that it is often impossible to
gain crucial information prior to the time of cross-examination itself. Interview with
Sherry Seiber, supra note 107.
'7' See note 57 supra.
See Appendix.
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nation of sufficiency.' Until the Colorado Supreme Court can
effectively define by decision the meaning of "sufficient," it may
well be that trial judges will differ considerably in determining
the sufficiency of the offer of proof, thus producing a serious situa-
tion of unequal justice.
The legislatures of Colorado, Michigan, California, and other
states have, in enacting their reformed sexual assault laws,
erected formidable and unprecedented barriers to a criminal de-
fendant's ability and opportunity to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him. A few states have taken a more rea-
soned approach by providing for a pretrial in camera hearing to
determine the relevancy of proposed evidence of the victim's prior
sexual conduct, without requiring the submission of an affidavit
and "sufficient" offer of proof as a prerequisite to such a hear-
ing.'74 In this way the purpose of sex crimes law reform-the pro-
tection of the victim from harassing and humiliating questioning
directed more toward swaying the jury by insinuation than to-
ward exposing relevant evidence-is achieved, and the defen-
dant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him is protected. The Colorado approach, however, because of its
affidavit and offer of proof provisions, may fail to satisfy sixth
amendment requirements.'75
,13 See California Rape Evidence Reform where, in discussing California's new law,
the author also points out the lack of indication of what kind of showing is necessary for
the offer of proof or of the form of the supporting affidavit. Id. at 1558. The author also
notes an additional problem with the affidavit procedure: The prosecutor may reveal the
contents to the victim and she "will get a preview of the evidence with which the defense
intends to confront her." Id. Certainly in some cases, no matter how few, this will only
compound the defendant's difficulties in discovering relevant evidence.
,", TEX. CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1975-76); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)
(West Supp. 1975-76); IowA CODE § 782.4 (1975).
,7 [1In view of the comprehensive language used by the Court [in
Davis], it is . . . likely that it would require the state to find some alterna-
tive method of encouraging women to report rape other than restricting the
defendant's right to cross-examine.
California Rape Evidence Reform 1571-72. The Colorado legislators may have been unwit-
tingly drawn into this error by basing the Colorado law partially on Michigan's law.
Interview with Richard Wood, supra note 4. As has been noted, the Michigan law requires
an affidavit and offer of proof prior to a hearing on the admissibility of evidence of the
victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence of specific instances of sexual
activity for the purpose of showing the source of pregnancy, semen, or disease. See note
149 supra. The Colorado law requires the affidavit and offer of proof prior to a hearing on
the admissibility of other types of evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim. C.R.S.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
A well-conceived criminal law must achieve the desired re-
sult in all cases arising out of the behavior which the law regu-
lates. This means that the law must operate to acquit the inno-
cent as well as convict the guilty. Although it is agreed that
changes in the present treatment afforded victims of sexual as-
saults are urgently needed, state legislatures must not act beyond
their constitutional authority and in derogation of constitutional
rights in attempting to effect such changes.
H.B. 1042 accomplishes much in the area of reclassification
of sexual offenses and elimination of offensive and antiquated
terminology. And the effort toward protection of victims from
unnecessary humiliation, while it may fall short of legislative
expectations in its effect on the reporting rate of sex crimes, does
represent an attitudinal change which is long overdue.
It is hoped, however, that the legislature will act as soon as
possible to correct the infringement of constitutional rights em-
bodied in section 407 by eliminating the affidavit and offer of
proof requirements. By doing so, the legislature could prevent an
extended period of uncertainty and case-by-case adjudication
concerning the method and extent of permissible limitation on
introduction of evidence in a sexual assault trial of the victim's
prior sexual conduct.
Elizabeth Lottman Schneider
§ 407. The difference is a significant one: The types of evidence covered by the Michigan
procedure would be known to the defendant or discoverable by normal discovery methods;
the types of evidence covered by the Colorado procedure would not necessarily be known
to the defendant or discoverable by him through any method other than cross-examination
of the victim.
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APPENDIX
House Bill No. 1042
SECTION 1. Part 4 of article 3 of title 18, Colorado Revised Statutes 1973,
is REPEALED AND REENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read:
PART 4
UNLAWFUL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
18-3-401. Definitions. As used in this part 4, unless the context otherwise
requires:
(1) "Actor" means the person accused of criminal sexual assault.
(2) "Intimate parts" means the external genitalia or the perineum or the
anus or the pubes of any person or the breast of a female person.
(3) "Physically helpless" means unconscious, asleep, or otherwise unable to
indicate willingness to act.
(4) "Sexual contact" means the intentional touching of the victim's inti-
mate parts by the actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or the
intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's
or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact can reasonably be construed as
being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(5) "Sexual intrusion" means any intrusion, however slight, by any object
or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue, or penis, into the
genital or anal opening of another person's body if that sexual intrusion can
reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratifica-
tion, or abuse.
(6) "Sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio,
analingus, or anal intercourse. Emission need not be proved as an element of
any sexual penetration. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to com-
plete the crime.
(7) "Victim" means the person alleging to have been subjected to a criminal
sexual assault.
18-3-402. Sexual assault in the first degree. (1) Any actor who inflicts sexual
penetration on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:
(a) The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual applica-
tion of physical force or physical violence; or
(b) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of imminent death,
serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyon e,
and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these
threats; or
(c) The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in
the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim reasonably
believes the actor will execute this threat. As used in this paragraph (c), "to
retaliate" includes threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury, or ex-
treme pain; or
(d) The actor has substantially impaired the victim's power to appraise or
control the victim's conduct by employing, without the victim's consent, any
drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose of causing submission; or
1976
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(e) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows the victim is
physically helpless, and the victim has not consented.
(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class 3 felony, but it is a class 2
felony if:
(a) In the commission of the sexual assault the actor is physically aided or
abetted by one or more other persons; or
(b) The victim suffers serious bodily injury; or
(c) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon and uses the deadly weapon
to cause submission of the victim.
18-3-403. Sexual assault in the second degree. (1) Any actor who inflicts
sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the
second degree if:
(a) The actor causes submission of the victim to sexual penetration by any
means other than those set forth in section 18-3-402, but of sufficient conse-
quence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will; or
(b) The actor causes submission of the victim to sexual intrusion by any
means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission
against the victim's will; or
(c) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature
of the victim's conduct; or
(d) The actor knows that the victim submits erroneously, believing the
actor to be the victim's spouse; or
(e) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than fifteen
years of age, and the actor is at least four years older than the victim; or
(f) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than eighteen
years of age and the actor is the victim's guardian or is responsible for the
general supervision of the victim's welfare; or
.(g) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institu-
tion and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and
uses this position of authority, unless the sexual intrusion is incident to a lawful
search, to coerce the victim to submit; or
(h) The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than
bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with rea-
sonable medical practices.
(2) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3
felony if the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim by use of such force,
intimidation, or threat as specified in section 18-3-402(1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c).
18-3-404. Sexual assault in the third degree. (1) Any actor who subjects a
victim to any sexual contact commits sexual assault in the third degree if:
(a) The actor knows that the victim does not consent; or
(b) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature
of the victim's conduct; or
(c) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows that the victim is
physically helpless, and the victim has not consented; or
(d) The actor has substantially impaired the victim's power to appraise or
control the victim's conduct by employing, without the victim's consent, any
drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose of causing submission; or
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(e) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than eighteen
years of age and the actor is the victim's guardian or is otherwise responsible
for the general supervision of the victim's welfare; or
(f) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institu-
tion and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and
uses this position of authority, unless incident to a lawful search, to coerce the
victim to submit; or
(g) The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than
bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with rea-
sonable medical practices.
(2) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class 1 misdemeanor, but it is a
class 4 felony if the actor compels the victim to submit by use of such force,
intimidation, or threat as specified in section 18-3-402(1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c).
18-3-405. Sexual assault on a child. (1) Any actor who subjects another not
his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a child if the
victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older
than the victim.
(2) Sexual assault on a child is a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3 felony if
the actor commits the offense on a victim by use of such force, intimidation, or
threat as specified in section 18-3-402(1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c).
18-3-406. Criminality of conduct. (1) If the criminality of conduct depends
on a child's being below the age of eighteen, and the child was in fact at least
fifteen years of age, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant reason-
ably believed the child to be eighteen years of age or older.
(2) If the criminality of conduct depends upon a child being below the age
of fifteen, it shall be no defense that the defendant did not know the child's age
or that he reasonably believed the child to be fifteen years of age or older.
18-3-407. Victim's prior history - evidentiary hearing. (1) Evidence of spe-
cific instances of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct, opinion evi-
dence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct shall be presumed to be irrelevant except:
(a) Evidence of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the
actor;
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or
origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual inter-
course offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts charged were or
were not committed by the defendant.
(2) In any criminal prosecution under sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405, or for
attempt or conspiracy to commit any crime under sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405,
if evidence, which is not excepted under subsection (1) of this section, of specific
instances of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct, or opinion evidence
of the victim's sexual conduct, or reputation evidence of the victim's sexual
conduct, or evidence that the victim has a history of false reporting of sexual
assaults, is to be offered at trial, the following procedure shall be followed:
(a) A written motion shall be made at least thirty days prior to trial, unless
later for good cause shown, to the court and to the opposing parties stating that
the moving party has an offer of proof of the relevancy and materiality of evi-
dence of specific instances of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct,
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or opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, or reputation evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct, or evidence that the victim has a history of false report-
ing of sexual assaults which is proposed to be presented.
(b) The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in which the
offer of proof shall be stated.
(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall notify
the other party of such and set a hearing to be held in camera prior to trial. In
such hearing, the court shall allow the questioning of the victim regarding the
offer of proof made by the moving party and shall otherwise allow a full presen-
tation of the offer of proof including, but not limited to, the presentation of
witnesses.
(d) An in camera hearing may be held during trial if evidence first becomes
available at the time of the trial, or for good cause shown.
(e) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the evidence
proposed to be offered regarding the sexual conduct of the victim is relevant to
a material issue to the case, the court shall order that evidence may be intro-
duced and proscribe [sic] the nature of the evidence or questions to be permit-
ted. The moving party may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the
court.
18-3-408. Jury instruction prohibited. In any criminal prosecution under
sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405, or for attempt or conspiracy to commit any crime
under sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405, the jury shall not be instructed to examine
with caution the testimony of the victim solely because of the nature of the
charge, nor shall the jury be instructed that such a charge is easy to make but
difficult to defend against, nor shall any similar instruction be given.
18-3-409. Marital exception. (1) The criminal sexual assault offenses of this
part 4 shall not apply to acts between persons who are married, either statuto-
rily, putatively, or by common law.
(2) The criminal sexual assault offenses of this part 4 shall apply to spouses
living apart, with the intent to live apart, whether or not under a decree of
judicial separation.
18-3-410. Medical exception. The provisions of this part 4" shall not apply
to any act performed for bona fide medical purposes provided that such act is
performed in a manner which is not inconsistent with reasonable medical
practices.
(Conforming amendments, effective date and safety clause omitted.)
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